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In Taylor v. State, 346 Md. 452, 697 A.2d 462 (1997), 
the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
held that evidence of a 
defendant's presence in a room 
where marijuana had been 
smoked, his knowledge of the 
drug use, and his close proximity 
to the discovered substance was 
insufficient to support a conviction 
for possession of marijuana. The 
court acknowledged that there 
was a strong probability of guilt, 
but refused to affirm a conviction 
based on circumstantial evidence 
where the trier of fact had to resort. 
to speculation or conjecture. In so 
holding, the court reaffirmed the 
sufficiency of evidence doctrine 
and resisted taking the distorted 
view of "beyond a reasonable 
doubt" that the lower courts 
followed. 
On the morning of June 10, 
1995, Ocean City Police Officer 
Bernal responded to a complaint 
at the Days Inn in Ocean City, 
Maryland. He was directed to a 
room registered to the Petitioner, 
Richard Taylor ("Taylor"), and four 
friends. Officer Bernal and the 
hotel manager noticed the smell of 
marijuana coming from the room. 
The officer enlisted a returning 
member of the room to knock on 
the door, and was admitted. 
There were five occupants in the 
room, including Taylor. Taylor was 
observed laying on the floor with 
his head turned toward the wall. 
Officer Bernal testified that he 
could not determine if Taylor was 
asleep. He also testified that he 
observed clouds of marijuana 
smoke in the air. The officer was 
granted permission to search the 
room for drugs. 
Taylor v. State: 
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After Officer Bernal threatened 
to conduct an extensive search of 
the entire premises, Chris Myers, 
an occupant of the room, handed 
a bag of marijuana to the officer 
and told him where another was 
hidden. Myers claimed ownership 
of the marijuana and was 
arrested. Officer Bernal then 
asked everyone in the room if they 
were smoking marijuana. Taylor 
and the other occupants denied 
any drug use and stated friends 
that had stopped by earlier were 
smoking marijuana. Although 
Officer Bernal noticed the smell of 
marijuana in the air, he did not see 
anyone smoking marijuana, nor 
was any visible. Taylor was 
subsequently arrested. 
At a bench trial, Taylor was 
convicted in the Circuit Court of 
Maryland for Worcester County of 
possession of marijuana in 
violation of Article 27, section 287 
of the Maryland Annotated Code. 
Recent Developments 
Based on the testimony of Officer 
Bernal, the trial court drew the 
inference that Taylor had been in 
possession of marijuana while in 
the hotel room. The trial court 
based the inference on Taylor's 
presence in the room while 
marijuana was being smoked, his 
knowledge that marijuana was in 
the room, and his possessory right 
in the premises. 
Taylor appealed to the Court 
of Special Appeals of Maryland 
contending that the evidence was 
insufficient to sustain a conviction. 
The court affirmed the conviction, 
holding the trial court's findings 
reasonable. The court added that 
Taylor's presence in a room where 
marijuana had recently been 
smoked led to the inference that 
he had recently smoked 
marijuana. The Court of Appeals 
of Maryland granted certiorari on 
Taylor's petition challenging the 
sufficiency of the evidence for his 
conviction. 
The court of appeals began its 
analysis by offering the standard 
of review for evidence sufficient to 
sustain a conviction. Taylor v. 
State, 346 Md. at 457,697 A.2d at 
465. The court explained that it 
would not measure the weight of 
the evidence, but only whether the 
verdict was supported by sufficient 
evidence to convince a trier of fact 
of the defendant's guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Id. (citing State 
v. Albrecht, 336 Md. 475, 478-79, 
649 A.2d 336, 337 (1994». 
The court then presented the 
statutory definition of possession 
as "the exercise of actual or 
constructive control over a thing 
by one or more persons." Id. at 
457,697 A.2d at 465 (quoting Md. 
28.1 U. Bait. L.F. 51 
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Ann. Code art. 27, § 277 (1992». 
The court added, "possession may 
be constructive or actual, 
exclusive or joint." Id. at 458, 697 
A.2d at 465. Under the proscribed 
definition, the court reviewed the 
State's case against Taylor. 
The court observed that the 
State relied on circumstantial 
evidence of joint and constructive 
possession. Id. at 458, 697 A.2d 
at 465. Acknowledging that a 
conviction may rest exclusively on 
circumstantial evidence, the court 
cautioned that the circumstances 
taken together cannot leave room 
for any conjecture or speculation 
by the trier of fact. Id. at 458, 697 
A.2d at 465. The court articulated 
that when the evidence at trial 
equally supports two versions of 
the events, and a finding of guilt 
requires speculation as to which 
version is true, a conviction cannot 
be sustained. Id. (citing Hebron v. 
State, 331 Md. 219, 627 A.2d 
1029 (1993». 
Applying these guidelines, the 
court stated Officer Bernal's 
testimony only established that 
Taylor was present in the room 
while marijuana was being 
smoked, that he was aware of the 
drug use, and that he was near a 
concealed container of marijuana. 
Id. at 459, 697 A.2d at 465. The 
court noted that Taylor was not in 
exclusive possession of the room 
and the discovered marijuana was 
never shown to be in Taylor's 
control. Id. The court concluded 
28.1 U. Bait. L.F. 52 
by stating, without direct evidence, 
a rational inference that Taylor 
possessed marijuana could not be 
supported by his presence in the 
room. Id. at 459, 697 A.2d at 466. 
Furthermore, the court 
determined the State failed to 
prove Taylor had knowledge of the 
existence of marijuana, an 
essential element of the charged 
offense. Id. at 460, 697 A.2d at 
466. The court reasoned that it 
would be impossible to exercise 
"dominion and control" over an 
object without first being aware of 
the presence of that object. Id. 
Although the circumstances led to 
a strong suspicion of Taylor's 
knowledge of the presence of 
marijuana, the court held that 
strong suspicion was not enough 
to sustain a conviction. Id. 
The court next turned to a 
review of Maryland appellate 
decisions where convictions for 
possession of controlled 
substances were reversed. Id. at 
461, 697 A.2d at 467. 
Summarizing the cases, the court 
noted a trend where convictions 
for possession were overturned 
because the evidence did not 
.. establish nor provide a reasonable 
inference to establish, that the 
accused exercised dominion or 
control over the contraband. Id. 
The court closed its analysis 
by highlighting a court of appeals 
decision with similar facts. Id. In 
Livingston v. State, 317 Md. 408, 
564 A.2d 414 (1989), the 
petitioner was charged with 
possession when police dis-
~overed two marijuana seeds in 
the front seat of a car. The court 
reversed the conviction, holding 
that the petitioner did not possess 
the requisite knowledge of the 
presence of marijuana seeds in 
the car, therefore he could not 
direct restraint or direction over 
the drugs. Id. at 463, 697 A.2d at 
467 (citing Livingston v. State, 317 
Md. 408, 564 A.2d 414 (1989». 
In Taylor v. State, the court 
held that a conviction for 
possession of marijuana must be 
based on evidence providing a 
reasonable inference that the 
defendant exercised dominion or 
control over the marijuana. This 
has long been the. standard in 
Maryland. The significance of this 
decision is twofold. First, the facts 
in Taylor came closer to fulfilling 
the elements for possession of 
marijuana than any case cited in 
the opinion. This affords future 
defendants an extended 
precedent with which they can 
dispute the sufficiency of evidence 
in their cases. Second, and more 
importantly, in a time when the 
war on drugs has created laws of 
suspect constitutionality, the Court 
of Appeals of Maryland resisted 
an opportunity to sustain a drug 
conviction on grounds less than 
the requisite standard of beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
